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Abstract 
The question of how to deal with uncertainty in environmental decision-making is cur-
rently attracting considerable attention on the part of scientists as well as of politicians 
and those involved in government administration. The existence of uncertainty becomes 
particularly apparent in the field of environmental policy because environmental prob-
lems are regarded as highly complex and long-term and because far-reaching changes 
have to be taken into account; moreover, the knowledge available to practitioners and 
policy makers alike is often fragmentary and not systemised. One key issue arising from 
this is the challenge to develop scientific decision support methods that are capable of 
dealing with uncertainty in a systematic and differentiated way, integrating scientific 
and practical knowledge. This paper introduces a conceptual framework for perceiving 
and describing uncertainty in environmental decision-making. It is argued that perceiv-
ing and describing uncertainty is an important prerequisite for deciding and acting under 
uncertainty. The conceptual framework consists of a general definition of uncertainty 
along with five complementary perspectives on the phenomenon, each highlighting one 
specific aspect of it. By using the conceptual framework, decision-makers are able to re-
flect on their knowledge base with regard to its completeness and reliability and to gain 
a broad picture of uncertainty from various standpoints. The theoretical ideas presented 
here are based on two empirical studies looking at how uncertainty is dealt with in the 
implementation process of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). The rather ab-
stract differentiations are illustrated by a number of examples in the form of interview 
statements and excerpts from the WFD and the WFD guidance documents Impress, 
Wateco und Proclan. 
 
Key Words: uncertainty, probability, lack of knowledge, pure ignorance, environ-
mental decision-making, EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). 
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1  Introduction 
Every day each one of us is forced to act and to make decisions under conditions of un-
certainty – this is true of our private lives as well as our involvement in public affairs. 
We are unsure as to which goals to pursue or what actions we should consider taking to 
achieve them, and neither can we predict all the consequences of these various actions. 
Uncertainty is a problem because it makes it difficult to decide what is best. Further-
more, decision-making is always affected by uncertainty because, by definition, a deci-
sion is a situation in which the decision-maker does not know a priori what to do.  
In the context of environmental decision-making the problem of uncertainty is par-
ticularly apparent for several reasons: 
•  Environmental problems are often regarded as particularly intractable because of 
the overwhelming diversity of nature, the countless dynamic natural processes 
involved – often non-linear and chaotic – as well as the many complex interac-
tions that take place between nature and human beings. Complexity and novelty 
makes it difficult to describe environmental problems precisely and to forecast 
the impacts of potential solutions. Typically the solution of environmental prob-
lems is not routine. 
•  In general, good solutions for environmental problems require a large amount of 
knowledge as a solid foundation for decision-making, but the knowledge avail-
able is fragmentary and not systemised (cf. Faber & Manstetten 2003). More-
over, it is typical of environmental problems that the relevant scientific knowl-
edge is spread over different disciplines, from the natural sciences to the social 
sciences, and cannot be easily merged. Furthermore, the integration of scientific 
knowledge and practical knowledge (know-how), as well as communication be-
tween scientists and practitioners, often poses problems.  
•  It is not only the knowledge base for decision-making that is frequently patchy 
with regard to facts – the normative foundation is also often unclear. In public 
environmental decision-making, the private preferences and interests of those re-
sponsible for making decisions should not play a decisive role. Normative objec-
tives for public decision-making such as sustainable development, efficiency, 
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welfare, justice and so on may provide a point of orientation but need to be ren-
dered in practical terms in relation to each given situation.  
The problem of uncertainty in environmental decision-making has recently received a 
great deal of attention on the part of scientists as well as of politicians and administra-
tors (e.g. Faber et al. 1992; Handmer et al. 2001; Harremoes 2003; Morgan & Henrion 
1990; Pahl-Wostl 2002, 2007). This paper explores the question of how to deal ade-
quately with the inevitable uncertainty involved in environmental decision-making. In 
doing so we identify two separate elements, or stages: 
1.  perceiving and describing uncertainty and 
2.  deciding and acting under uncertainty.  
Most of the relevant literature appears to concentrate on the second stage. However, the 
focus in this article is on the first stage, where the knowledge base is the main object of 
reflection with regard to its completeness and reliability. We are convinced that giving 
sufficient emphasis to the first stage is a prerequisite for making good decisions, par-
ticularly in complex situations where politicians or members of competent authorities 
have a public mandate to act and are therefore obliged to act in a responsible, consid-
ered and effective manner for the welfare of all.
1  
Our paper represents a contribution to the debate on uncertainty by presenting a 
conceptual framework for perceiving and describing uncertainty in environmental deci-
sion-making. This framework is intended to enable decision-makers to gain a compre-
hensive picture of their uncertainty in practical decision-making situations.  
In order to illustrate and substantiate the conceptual framework we use the empirical 
example of the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) (EU 2000). The WFD 
came into force in December 2000 and sets the legal framework for the protection and 
management of water resources in the European Union. The Directive establishes ambi-
tious and challenging environmental objectives. It is an interesting case for studying un-
certainty in public environmental decision-making because its implementation is a 
complex matter that is taken very seriously by the EU Member States. Our empirical 
work is based on  
                                                 
1 Note that both stages are interlinked: on the one hand, dealing consciously and responsibly with un-
certainty (stage 2) requires a high level of awareness and cognition of uncertainties (stage 1). On the other 
hand, in most cases the perception and description of uncertainties takes place in a context of deciding 
and acting.  
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•  a textual analysis
2 of the WFD as well as three guidance documents (Impress 
2003; Proclan 2003; Wateco 2003) which are part of the common implementa-
tion strategy (CIS) of the European Commission (cf. Sigel 2007),  
•  expert interviews with representatives from German water management authori-
ties who are responsible for implementing the WFD
3 (cf. Sigel 2007) and  
•  the consulting activities of the authors for several German federal states and 
competent authorities (Ammermüller et al. in press; Klauer et al. 2007a; Klauer 
et al. 2007b; Klauer et al. 2008).  
The paper is organised as follows: first, we outline the main objectives and some basic 
principles of the WFD, with a special emphasis on the problems of uncertainty associ-
ated with its implementation. This is necessary for an understanding of the practical ex-
amples contained in the subsequent sections. In section 3, we introduce the conceptual 
framework used to describe uncertainty. The framework consists of (i) a general defini-
tion of uncertainty and (ii) five complementary perspectives on uncertainty which are 
explained in section 4 and section 5 respectively. The paper concludes in section 6 with 
some critical reflections on the opportunities and limits of the conceptual framework, 
the necessary prerequisites for its application, and further research needs.  
2  The EU Water Framework Directive  
The WFD has had a major influence on water resource management in the European 
Union since it came into force in 2000. The Directive is widely recognised as innovative 
in many respects (Klauer et al. in press; Moss 2003; Rumm et al. 2006). Some of its 
more significant innovative elements are:  
•  The environmental objective of ‘good status’. In Article 4.1 the WFD – for the 
first time in EU legislation – sets comprehensive and legally binding environ-
mental objectives for the protection of all waters. These it sums up under the 
term good status. For surface waters, for instance, good status is comprised of 
                                                 
2 The methodological procedure used is known in qualitative social scientific research as ‘structuring 
content analysis’ (Mayring 2003). 
3 Six qualitative interviews of about 90 min each were recorded, transcribed and analysed based on the 
expert interview methodology described by Lamnek (1995) and Meuser and Nagel (1991). The interview 
was structured by an interview guide consisting of a short introductory phase and five topics connected 
with the implementation of the WFD and uncertainty. 
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several components of ecological as well as chemical quality (WFD, Annex V). 
A river or a lake enjoys good ecological status if it “shows low levels of distor-
tion resulting from human activity”. For artificial and heavily modified water 
bodies, such as canals or drinking water reservoirs (Art. 4.3, WFD), the objective 
is not good ecological status but good ecological potential. In exceptional cases 
the Directive allows for deadlines to be extended (Art. 4.4, WFD) and for envi-
ronmental objectives to be softened (Art. 4.5, WFD) – this issue is discussed un-
der the umbrella term exemptions. 
•  Long-term perspective. The implementation of the WFD is spread over a period 
of more than 25 years. Some important milestones in water management are (i) 
the adoption of river basin management plans in 2009, including a programme of 
measures stipulating how the relevant environmental objectives are to be 
achieved (Art. 13 and 11, WFD) and (ii) the achievement of good status (or good 
potential) by 2015. After 2015 new management plans are to be devised and ex-
emptions revised every six years.  
•  Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). The concept of IWRM em-
phasises the importance of spatial planning and sectoral integration in water re-
sources management and places it in the context of sustainable development 
(OECD 1989, GWP 2000). The WFD can be seen as an attempt to realise IWRM 
(Klauer et al. in press), mainly because it requires the coordination of administra-
tive arrangements among different river basin districts (Art. 3, WFD) as well as 
management measures in different economic sectors (particularly the water sec-
tor and agriculture) in order for its environmental objectives to be achieved.  
The implementation of the WFD implies a considerable challenge for the competent au-
thorities. In nearly all cases the authorities do not have a comprehensive knowledge 
base for making the necessary decisions, and hence they are forced to act and decide 
under uncertainty (Mysiak & Sigel 2005). The Wateco guidance document calls uncer-
tainty one of the “key issues” that “remain to be explored”. According to the document, 
the pressing methodological questions are: “How to deal with uncertainty: which ap-
proaches can be proposed to water managers for integrating uncertainty into decision-
making and for developing adequate communication on uncertainty towards the public 
and stakeholders?” (Wateco 2003: 48). 
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Obviously, uncertainty may have a negative impact on the achievement of the WFD 
goals. Uncertainty is also relevant in relation to the fact that the decisions to be made by 
the competent authorities are public decisions. In order to be transparent and open to 
public scrutiny and possible criticism, uncertainties need to be clearly spelt out and re-
ported during the decision-making process. 
3  A conceptual framework for perceiving and describing 
uncertainty in environmental decision-making 
The standard scientific approach for conceptualising perceptions and descriptions of un-
certainty is to quantify uncertainty in terms of probabilities. Classical economic theory 
regarding decision-making, which investigates how uncertainty should be dealt with ra-
tionally, is also rooted in probability theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). 
However, it has been widely acknowledged in more recent environmental literature that 
probabilities are only one of many possibilities for conceptualising uncertainty. Several 
taxonomies of uncertainty that have been put forward attempt to systemise and concep-
tualise the many varied aspects of uncertainty and ignorance (e.g. Brown et al. 2005; 
Faber et al. 1992; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990; Klauer & Brown 2004; Smithson 1989; 
van Asselt 2000; Walker et al. 2003; Wynne 1992). These taxonomies use several sort-
ing criteria, or questions, to classify uncertainty such as “Is uncertainty reducible?” or 
”Are all possible outcomes of a random experiment known?”. The latter question indi-
cates that they also make some use of the concept of the theory of probability.  
In the following we introduce a conceptual framework of uncertainty that aims to 
describe uncertainty in environmental decision-making in a broad and differentiated 
way. For this, several important aspects of uncertainty (some of which have been speci-
fied within existing approaches and taxonomies) have been selected, explored in greater 
detail, expanded in scope and integrated into the framework. The framework consists of 
a general definition of uncertainty and five complementary perspectives on uncertainty 
(see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Structure of the conceptual framework of uncertainty 
•  General definition of uncertainty 
•  Complementary perspectives on uncertainty: 
1.  Description of uncertainty on the basis of the theory of probability 
2.  Sources of uncertainty 
3.  Fact-related and norm-related uncertainty 
4.  Causes of uncertainty 
5.  Reducibility of uncertainty 
The general definition serves as a broad characterisation of uncertainty and provides the 
basis for an advanced description of uncertainty using different ‘perspectives on uncer-
tainty’. Each perspective highlights one specific aspect of uncertainty. As these perspec-
tives are complementary, they combine to produce a broad and differentiated descrip-
tion of uncertainty. This can be imagined in terms of different spotlights illuminating a 
single object from different points of view. Thus the relationship between the five per-
spectives is not as systematic as is usually the case in taxonomies
4. However, comple-
mentary perspectives enrich our understanding of the multifaceted nature of uncertainty. 
The general definition as well as the perspectives on uncertainty are supplemented and 
reinforced by further definitions of uncertainty-related notions such as ‘certainty’, ‘lack 
of knowledge’, ‘fact-related uncertainty’ and ‘norm-related uncertainty’. 
The focus of the concept lies on uncertainty from the viewpoint of a single decision-
maker. In the case of the WFD, decisions are taken by the competent authorities. These 
authorities exist in the form of complicated networks and hierarchies consisting of sev-
eral individuals with different competencies and responsibilities and of the social inter-
actions that take place between them. The assumption of a single decision-maker consti-
tutes a considerable simplification which means that uncertainties relevant to the deci-
                                                 
4 In contrast to our conceptual framework, taxonomy is a classification. That is, it divides all possible 
cases into several categories so that every case belongs to exactly one category. In other words, the cate-
gories do not overlap. 
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sion-making process remain neglected.
5 However, we are confident that in a first ap-
proach it is sensible to separate these aspects.  
The two parts of the concept of uncertainty – ‘General definition of uncertainty’ and 
‘Complementary perspectives on uncertainty’ – are described in detail in the two sec-
tions that follow.  
4  A general definition of uncertainty 
In order to express more precisely what we are talking about, we shall now provide a 
formal definition of the terms ‘uncertainty’, ‘certainty’ and ‘lack of knowledge’, and of-
fer some explanatory comments on ‘pure ignorance’. All these definitions refer to the 
context of public decision-making situations in the field of environmental politics, even 
if this is not stated explicitly. 
Definition of uncertainty: A person is uncertain if he
6 lacks confidence about 
his knowledge relating to a specific question. 
Anyone who wants to describe their uncertainty relating to a specific question has to re-
flect on their state of knowledge. These reflections refer to two different levels: (i) their 
knowledge about the situation and (ii) their degree of confidence about this knowledge. 
Being confident or not is a subjective perception. Hence, uncertainty as understood here 
is a subjective phenomenon.
7 This implies that an adequate assessment of uncertainty 
always requires an attitude of openness and a person’s ability to assess the reliability of 
their knowledge. 
For the purpose of better understanding, the theoretical ideas presented here will be 
illustrated in the following using empirical examples from the WFD (based on Sigel 
2007). These examples are separated from the main text by boxes. 
                                                 
5 In the literature this kind of uncertainty is often described as ‘ambiguity’, ‘interaction uncertainty’ or 
‘political uncertainty’ (Handmer et al. 2001: XV; Morgan & Henrion 1990: 24; Walker & Marchau 
2003). 
6 Although the male personal pronoun is used at times in this text to make for easier reading, the refer-
ence is always to both women and men. 
7 Nevertheless, uncertainty in general has also objective aspects. For example, the fact that rolling a 
common dice has six different potential outcomes is independent from the person throwing the dice.  
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The understanding of uncertainty in the WFD 
The WFD does not refer to ‘uncertainty’ as such. Instead the converse ex-
pression adequate level of confidence and precision is used. Regarding 
frequency in relation to monitoring the status of water bodies it is said, for 
example:  
“Frequencies shall be chosen so as to achieve an acceptable level of 
confidence and precision. Estimates of the confidence and precision 
attained by the monitoring system used shall be stated in the river 
basin management plan” (Annex V 1.3.4, WFD). 
Instead of the term ‘adequate’ (as applied to the level of confidence and 
precision), the WFD also uses the expressions ‘sufficient’ and ‘accept-
able’. The term ‘confidence’ refers to the subjective nature of uncertainty, 
as in our definition. By using the term ‘precision’ the WFD also refers to 
the objective nature of uncertainty.  
Confidence about knowledge may range from ‘being certain’ to ‘admitting to know 
nothing’ (of use). In other words, the spectrum of uncertainty ranges between two ex-
tremes: certainty and lack of knowledge (see Figure 1). 














In practice, it is barely possible to distinguish clearly between certainty, uncertainty and 
lack of knowledge because a continuous transition exists between certainty and lack of 
knowledge. Pure certainty and pure lack of knowledge rarely occur in practice. Never-
theless, for the purpose of understanding uncertainty it is helpful to define even these 
extreme forms: 
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Definition of certainty: A person is certain if he is confident about his know-
ledge relating to a specific question.
8 
Definition of lack of knowledge: Lack of knowledge is a state in which a per-
son has no knowledge relating to a specific question but is nonetheless able 
to specify precisely what knowledge he lacks. 
In the case of ‘lack of knowledge’ there is no knowledge to evaluate regarding its reli-
ability. However, the person has an idea what he could or should know about the prob-
lem at issue. This means he is already aware of the problem that he lacks specific 
knowledge. 
Examples of certainty in the implementation of the WFD  
An example of ‘certainty’ can be found in the WFD guidance document 
Impress, in a short paragraph about modelling approaches as tool for the 
analysis of pressures and impacts: 
“Such models, if applied appropriately, are generally good at repre-
senting the water quality along a river in which the inflows from 
tributaries and point sources are well known or can be estimated re-
liably” (Impress 2003: 35). 
In the following example taken from one of the expert interviews, a water 
manager expresses his certainty about point discharges: 
“What we know quite well are point discharges, in other words sew-
age plants” (interview statement). 
 
Examples of lack of knowledge in the implementation of the WFD  
The expression ‘gaps in information and knowledge’ used by the guidance 
document Wateco comes very close to the expression ‘lack of knowledge’ 
as defined here. In the context of economic analysis, Wateco points out 
                                                 
8 Note that certainty does not automatically imply that the person knows everything that is relevant for 
making the decision. 
  10 
that the ‘information and knowledge base’ has to be improved by ‘filling 
key information and knowledge gaps’ (Wateco 2003). Similar expressions 
used by Wateco are ‘gaps in technical expertise’, ‘gaps in available data’, 
‘information and knowledge needs’ or ‘research needs’. According to 
Wateco these gaps have to be filled over time. Thus, what Wateco is refer-
ring to here is a form of reducible uncertainty. 
In the following example, a water manager expresses his lack of knowl-
edge relating to the effectiveness of fish passes: 
“It starts with the fish passes, that you can’t predict whether it will 
be accepted by the fish or not. There are experiments where the fish 
eventually come up but don’t come down because they can’t find it. 
There are so many possibilities, it’s nearly impossible to make any 
predictions” (interview statement). 
To sum up, one can say that uncertainty (including certainty and lack of knowledge) is a 
state characterised by a person’s reflection on and confidence in his knowledge. The 
person is able to reflect on his knowledge, or rather to specify in which he lacks knowl-
edge. Consequently, uncertainty is situated within a person’s knowledge horizon. 
We now turn to address a domain that is located outside the range of uncertainty: 
pure ignorance. Pure ignorance cannot be described or defined; it can only be known in 
an abstract sense. According to Faber et al. (1992) pure ignorance is of an indefinite na-
ture, like the future itself. It cannot be limited or constrained to any particular area of 
knowledge, as it encompasses all areas of life and development. We can identify pure 
ignorance only ex post as, for example, when things happen that make us aware of a 
problem to which we had previously paid no attention – this phenomenon is also de-
scribed as surprise. Dealing in a conscious way with pure ignorance is only possible to 
the extent that we have a desire continuously to broaden our knowledge horizons. This 
means adopting an attitude of openness towards and awareness of novelty and unex-
pected events. With regard to the development of strategies for dealing with uncertainty 
it is important to realise that pure ignorance exists and that there is a continuous transi-
tion between uncertainty and pure ignorance.  
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5  Complementary perspectives on uncertainty 
The concept of uncertainty introduced in this paper comprises five perspectives on un-
certainty (see Table 1). In the following we will describe each of the different perspec-
tives in turn in greater detail.  
5.1  Description of uncertainty on the basis of the theory of probability 
Probabilities are the standard scientific approach to conceptualising uncertainty. The 
aim of probability theory is to quantify uncertainty in order to (i) predict the outcome of 
possible future events or to (ii) assess past events in terms of whether they can be seen 
as common or unusual. (Both are usually done with a view to assessing and calculating 
opportunities and risks.)  
Within the theory of probability, uncertainty is represented by (i) several potential 
‘outcomes’ of events (processes, actions, random experiments) and (ii) ‘probabilities’ 
(likelihood, chance) expressing the degree of confidence (belief) that the specific out-
come will occur. The basic idea is that probabilities can be interpreted as frequencies 
(e.g. “it happens in one of six cases”).
9 When applying probability theory to a specific 
situation, it is necessary to make sure (i) that all possible outcomes are deemed to be 
known and (ii) that probabilities can be determined reliably (Brown 2004). Only in this 
case – also known as ‘risk’ (Faber et al. 1992) – can the powerful tools of probability 
theory, statistics and classical economic theories of decision-making be applied. 
Theoretically, situations involving uncertainty can always be described in such a 
way that all possible outcomes are known (by adjusting representations of the real world 
situation in a certain way) and that all probabilities are known (by using subjective 
probabilities) (Eisenführ & Weber 1999: 152). However, in the context of environ-
mental decision-making it can be argued that such a conceptualisation of uncertainty 
may not do justice to the problems involved. There are several reasons for this. First, 
there are situations in which it is inappropriate to assume that all (relevant) possible 
outcomes are known. Consider, for example, a situation where the possible long-term 
                                                 
9 It is often argued that frequentistic probabilities assume a large number of similar events while subjec-
tive probabilities can also be applied to special, one-off events (Eisenführ & Weber 1999: 152-153). This 
argument can be countered by the fact that subjective probabilities also need a kind of repetition because 
they can be substantiated only if the person has experience with similar situations (Sigel 2007: 55-56).  
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impacts of a new chemical substance on aquatic ecosystems are relevant. Due to the 
complex behaviour of chemical substances in the environment it is possible – and even 
likely – that new, unexpected reactions and effects will occur. Second, probabilities 
trace uncertainty back to frequencies and repetitions. In situations characterised by their 
uniqueness, it is doubtful whether recourse to the frequency of phenomena in similar 
situations offers much insight into the uncertainties involved.
10  
The quantification of uncertainty in terms of probabilities requires extensive knowl-
edge of the situation under consideration and simultaneously narrows down the uncer-
tainty perception on a few aspects. Nevertheless, the theory of probability remains an 
important approach because statistics is a powerful tool for describing uncertainty and 
for developing recommendations for action. However, our empirical studies on the im-
plementation process of the WFD have shown that the authors of the guidance docu-
ments and the practitioners working at the competent authorities rarely use probabilities 
for dealing with uncertainties. 
5.2  Sources of uncertainty 
In the relevant literature, the expression ‘sources of uncertainty’ is often used but rarely 
explained. Whereas several authors use the term ‘sources’ to refer to causes (e.g. van 
Asselt 2000) we will use this term in the following sense:  
Definition of source of uncertainty: The source of uncertainty refers to the 
point of reference of uncertainty, i.e. it indicates to what knowledge or what 
specific question the uncertainty of a person is related. 
Sources of uncertainty are manifestations of uncertainty in a specific context. They em-
phasize the relational and context-specific nature of uncertainty in decision-making. The 
key question is: with regard to what does uncertainty occur? Causes of uncertainty – as 
will be explained in more detail below – refer to either the epistemological origin of or 
practical reasons for uncertainty. 
Knowing where the sources of uncertainty lie is helpful for making an initial de 
scription of the uncertainty and ‘localising’ it within a decision-making process. Local-
                                                 
10 For an extensive discussion of probability theory in the light of environmental decisions, see Sigel 
(2007). 
  13 
isation is easier if the decision-making process follows a given structure. One example 
of such a structure in the context of the implementation of the WFD can be found in 
Klauer et al. (2007a), where the process of selecting measures to be included in the 
overall programme of measures is divided into nine consecutive steps. The most impor-
tant steps are: (i) assessing the water status, (ii) identifying causes and setting develop-
ment targets, (iii) pre-selecting measures and estimating their costs and impacts, (iv) 
creating combinations of measures and selecting the most appropriate combination, (v) 
checking for exemptions and prioritising measures where necessary. Each step repre-
sents one potential source of uncertainty. As these steps aim to describe the entire selec-
tion process, a description of sources of uncertainty based on this structure can claim to 
be complete. However, one should be aware that a different structure may lead to other 
sources of uncertainty. 
Examples of sources of uncertainty in the implementation of the WFD 
and in scientific literature on hydrological modelling 
In the following example, the WFD expert being interviewed refers to un-
certainty in the context of selecting measures, and more specifically of as-
sessing the effectiveness of measures:  
“Regarding the programme of measures, I think that the most diffi-
cult part will be to identify those measures with the greatest effec-
tiveness” (interview statement). 
The guidance document Impress mentions two main sources of uncer-
tainty in the analysis of pressures and impacts: uncertainties relating to 
environmental conditions and uncertainties relating to estimated impacts: 
“Member States will need to complete the first analyses using ap-
propriate estimates for pressures and impacts but they should be 
aware, and take account of the uncertainties in the environmental 
conditions required to meet the Directives’ objectives and the uncer-
tainties in the estimated impacts” (Impress 2003: 19). 
In terms of reflecting on the reliability of hydrological models, the identi-
fication of possible sources of uncertainty plays an important role. Brown 
and Heuvelink (2003), for instance, distinguish between data and models 
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in relation to uncertainty, pointing out that there are “unique sources of 
uncertainty in each case”: 
“In practice, the main sources of uncertainty in data include (…): 
lack of measurements; measurement error; errors in the calibration 
of measurement instruments; imprecise or otherwise ambiguous lan-
guage; use of inadequate or inappropriate scales (sampling); data 
transformation errors; errors in measurement units; conceptual er-
rors in formulating sampling strategies; logical errors in formulating 
sampling strategies and recording errors” (Brown & Heuvelink 
2003: 3). 
“In practice, errors and uncertainties in models arise from three 
main sources, namely: 1) model structure (fixed), 2) model vari-
ables and 3) model solution (mainly numerical models)” (Brown & 
Heuvelink 2003: 3-4). 
5.3  Fact-related and norm-related uncertainty 
According to the general definition, uncertainty is always related to knowledge. In this 
perspective on uncertainty we distinguish between two forms of knowledge that are 
very important for decision-making: knowledge about facts and knowledge about norms 
and values. Accordingly, we differentiate between fact-related and norm-related uncer-
tainty. The literature contains very varied definitions of fact-related and norm-related 
uncertainty (Arentsen et al. 2000; Gottschalk-Mazouz 2003; Newig et al. 2005). The 
definitions we propose are derived from the general definition of uncertainty given in 
the previous section: 
Definition of fact-related uncertainty: Fact-related uncertainty exists when 
a person lacks confidence about his knowledge regarding facts. 
Definition of norm-related uncertainty: Norm-related uncertainty exists 
when a person lacks confidence about his knowledge regarding norms and 
values. 
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Fact-related knowledge is necessary for describing reality. It claims to be true, compre-
hensible to others and, thus, objective. Furthermore, fact-related knowledge often 
claims to be value-free. There are many different ways to acquire fact-related knowl-
edge – from gaining practical experience to conducting scientific studies.  
Examples of fact-related uncertainty in the implementation of the 
WFD 
In implementing the WFD the competent authorities need a large amount 
of fact-related knowledge; this knowledge is often affected by uncertainty. 
In the following example, the guidance document Wateco calls attention 
to uncertainty in relation to the programme of measures designed to be the 
main WFD instrument for achieving good status (at least) for all waters: 
“Uncertainty on costs, effectiveness and time-lagged effects of 
measures needs to be dealt with throughout the economic analysis 
process, and more generally throughout the process of identifying 
measures and developing the river basin management plan” 
(Wateco 2003: 26). 
The following statement by an expert refers to the pressures and impacts 
analysis prescribed by the WFD. Here, the water manager expresses un-
certainty relating to hydromorphological pressures and their biological 
impacts: 
“When speaking about hydromorphological pressures there are 
some basic uncertainties concerning the impacts for the aquatic eco-
system. For instance, it can’t be argued simply that a dam always af-
fects the aquatic organisms – presumably rather not” (interview 
statement). 
The European legislator can not and does not want to prescribe every detail of imple-
mentation of the WFD. In many cases the Directive needs to be interpreted and substan-
tiated individually by the member states and their competent authorities. Uncertainty 
occurring in this context is norm-related uncertainty.  
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Norm-related uncertainty can be interpreted in a positive sense, as it gives room for 
freedom of action and for processes of social learning and adaptation. However, norm-
related uncertainty also entails the risk of arbitrariness in decision-making and of ne-
glecting one’s responsibilities. 
Examples of norm-related uncertainty in the implementation of the 
WFD 
Of the analysed guidance documents Impress, Wateco und Proclan, only 
Impress refers to norm-related uncertainty. Under the heading ‘taking ac-
count of uncertainty’ it is said: 
“The first pressures and impacts analyses must be complete by the 
end of 2004. However, the environmental conditions required to 
meet most of the Directive’s objectives will not have been firmly 
defined by this date. For example, the values for the boundaries be-
tween the ecological status classes for surface waters are not ex-
pected to be finally determined until after the end of the intercali-
bration exercise (Annex V 1.4 WFD) and the start of the monitoring 
programmes in 2006 (Article 8)” (Impress 2003: 17). 
For most of the water managers interviewed, normative uncertainty is a 
major challenge. In the following citation, the interviewee refers to the 
problem that the expression ‘good ecological status’ used by the WFD has 
to be interpreted and rendered concrete: 
“Certainly we will have to define again what we mean exactly by 
‘good ecological status’ or what we want to achieve at best, because 
this is also a socio-political question” (interview statement). 
In the context of environmental decision-making, both forms of knowledge – fact-
related and norm-related – are important in most cases. In practice it is often difficult to 
distinguish clearly between fact-related and norm-related uncertainty. One reason for 
this is that both kinds are partially interdependent (Morgan & Henrion 1990). If, for ex-
ample, a decision-maker implementing the WFD has to evaluate whether the costs of 
the programme of measures selected for a certain water body are proportionate or not, 
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he has to know what these costs are (fact-related knowledge). If he is uncertain about 
these costs, the evaluation of (dis-)proportionality will also be affected by uncertainty. 
Thus norm-related uncertainty may be rooted in fact-related uncertainty.  
At the same time, fact-related knowledge is determined to a great extent by norm-
related knowledge. Within the process of pre-selection of measures, a decision-maker 
will presumably prefer those measures that correspond best to his interpretation of the 
WFD’s objectives and that accord with his interests. Accordingly, he will try to gain as 
much fact-related knowledge about these measures as possible and will not pay as much 
attention to the others. In general, fact-related knowledge is inevitably associated with 
more or less implicit value judgements. Pure fact-related knowledge and pure fact-
related uncertainty rarely exist. Whether a decision-maker concentrates more on fact-
related or more on norm-related knowledge and uncertainty depends on the problem at 
hand and on his cognitive interest. 
5.4  Causes of uncertainty 
Some taxonomies are built at least partially on a distinction between different causes of 
uncertainty (Brown 2004; Faber et al. 1992; Jaeger 2002; van Asselt 2000). In our con-
ceptual framework of uncertainty, a basic distinction is made between ‘fundamental’ 
causes of uncertainty and ‘practical’ causes of uncertainty. We shall discuss each of 
these in turn, paying greater attention to the latter because it is more relevant with re-
gard to the implementation of the WFD. 
There are two forms of fundamental causes of uncertainty: phenomenological uncer-
tainty and epistemological uncertainty. The first relates to phenomena and the second to 
the cognition of these phenomena by a person. If the question is, for example, why 
weather forecasts are affected by uncertainty, there are two basic options for a response: 
either the processes in the atmosphere are not predictable (because of their chaotic be-
haviour, say) or our weather models are not good enough to provide a precise descrip-
tion of the relevant processes. In practice, it is not possible to make a clear distinction 
between these two fundamental causes of uncertainty. Uncertainty is always rooted in 
both, in the phenomena and in the cognitive faculties of the observer. This implies that 
uncertainty is of both an objective and a subjective nature. 
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In addition to these fundamental causes, a decision-maker will normally try to iden-
tify the practical causes of his uncertainty in a specific case, not least because this may 
be helpful for reducing uncertainty. The key question here is: why is it not possible in 
practice to generate ‘certain’ knowledge? By way of an example, let us answer this 
question in relation to the implementation of the WFD. The analysis of the WFD expert 
interviews and the selected guidance documents makes it possible to establish a list of 
possible causes of uncertainty in the implementation of the WFD, as shown in Table 2 
(cf. Sigel 2007). 
Table 2: Possible causes of uncertainty in the implementation of the WFD  
•  Difficulties in describing water-related problems. 
•  Difficulties in interpreting the normative demands of the 
WFD and relating them to practical circumstances. 
•  Developments and factors which cannot be influenced or 
controlled. 
•  Difficulties in predicting human behaviour, particularly in 
social interactions and negotiation processes. 
•  Restricted capacities for analysis due to finite financial re-
sources. 
Five ‘causes of uncertainty’ are listed here. Each bullet point refers to a specific issue 
and also represents in part a specific approach to uncertainty. Hence, there may be some 
degree of overlap. Furthermore, the list may be refined and each of the causes split into 
different ‘sub-causes’.  
Unlike a taxonomy, the list is not the result of a systematic top-down sorting process 
but rather a bottom-up clustering process. Prima facie this could be seen as a disadvan-
tage. However, its advantage is that the clustering facilitates the identification of typical 
causes in practical decision-making situations and can easily be expanded and adapted 
to new situations. Bullet points 1 and 2 correspond to ‘fact-related uncertainty’ and 
‘norm-related uncertainty’. The following examples from the implementation of the 
WFD will therefore focus on causes 3, 4 and 5. Bullet point 3 corresponds to the under-
standing of uncertainty as expressed in classical economic theory on decision-making: a 
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decision is considered to be uncertain if there are developments and factors which can-
not be influenced or controlled by the decision-maker. Against the background of our 
conceptual framework of uncertainty and, in particular, the other possible causes, the 
limited nature of the perception of uncertainty in classical economic decision-making 
theory becomes apparent. 
Examples of causes of uncertainty in the implementation of the WFD 
•  Developments and factors which cannot be influenced or controlled: 
“There are some states of dependence which are fairly blatant, like 
with agriculture. We can only influence agricultural developments 
indirectly, mainly via subsidies, incentive schemes or land pur-
chase” (interview statement). 
•  Difficulties in predicting human behaviour, particularly in social inter-
actions and negotiation processes: 
“There are some difficulties concerning non-point sources …. Here 
we have a conflict situation characterised by relatively strong eco-
nomic interests …. It is possible that twenty percent of the stake-
holders just don’t believe in the facts, even if they are proven, that’s 
just the way it is” (interview statement). 
•  Restricted capacities for analysis due to finite financial resources: 
“In the end we are faced with a financial problem. If I think about 
the financial situation, the total amount of money needed to imple-
ment the WFD, then I am really concerned” (interview statement). 
Thinking about the causes of uncertainty is of particular interest if one wants to reduce 
uncertainty. The causes may provide pointers towards whether it is possible to reduce 
uncertainty and, if so, how this could be done.  
5.5  Reducibility of uncertainty 
Reducibility is a key characteristic of uncertainty and is closely related to the second 
stage of how to deal appropriately with inevitable uncertainty: deciding and acting un-
der uncertainty (cf. section 1). In practice, a decision-maker is often confronted with the 
question of whether he should make a decision on the basis of his actual (uncertain) 
knowledge or whether he should first try to reduce his uncertainty. According to our 
general definition of uncertainty there are two different levels that can serve as starting 
points for reducing uncertainty: (i) the level of knowledge and (ii) the level of confi-
dence about knowledge. 
In relation to (i), uncertainty can be reduced by generating knowledge. If the knowl-
edge required is already available in society but not available for a specific individual, 
this can be denoted as learning. Scientific research refers to knowledge that has not yet 
become available in society (Faber et al. 1992). Another way of reducing uncertainty is 
(ii) to increase confidence about a given aspect of knowledge, for example by clarifying 
whether or not this knowledge stems from reliable sources. 
When thinking about the reducibility of uncertainty, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween ‘fundamental’ reducibility and ‘practical’ reducibility – much as we did in rela-
tion to ‘causes of uncertainty’. The reducibility of uncertainty is restricted fundamen-
tally. This means that uncertainty never can be eliminated entirely. The reasons for this 
are, amongst others, the emergence of unpredictable events (novelty), the chaotic be-
haviour of certain dynamic systems, and freedom of action on the part of human be-
ings.
11  
However, from a practical point of view as well the question of whether or not un-
certainty is reducible is of considerable importance. The following examples show what 
the experts and authors think about the reducibility of uncertainty in relation to the im-
plementation of the WFD. One can see that the answer strongly depends on the causes 
to which they attribute their uncertainty. 
                                                 
11 A detailed description of reasons for the restricted reducibility of uncertainty can be found in Faber et 
al. (1992). Here, the authors distinguish between ‘irreducible phenomenological ignorance’ and ‘irreduci-
ble epistemological ignorance’. 
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Examples of the reducibility of uncertainty in the implementation of 
the WFD 
The guidance document Proclan points out that uncertainty is an inevita-
ble element in planning processes and hence cannot be reduced to zero: 
“Uncertainty is always an element in the planning process. It arises 
because of the complexity of the many factors involved. In fact, 
meteorological, demographic, social, technical, and political condi-
tions which will determine the planning process have behaviour 
patterns not always known with sufficient accuracy” (Proclan 
2003: 16). 
According to several interview partners uncertainty is reducible, depend-
ing mainly on the financial resources available: 
“Either it is possible to gain information or it is impossible. And 
this depends mostly on the funds available” (interview statement). 
However, some also reason that a kind of uncertainty exists which cannot 
be reduced easily:  
“When evaluating ecosystems, one has to recognise that within the 
assessment process statistics always plays some kind of role. (…) 
The status of an ecosystem is always defined by a statistical value. 
This cannot be compared with laboratory values in chemical engi-
neering. And here I think that the potential improvements are lim-
ited” (interview statement). 
Environmental decision-making is always affected by uncertainty. The question as to 
whether or not a decision-maker should try to reduce his uncertainty cannot be an-
swered easily – this must be decided from case to case.  
6  Concluding remarks 
Our starting point for developing a conceptual framework to describe uncertainty in en-
vironmental decision-making was the conviction that the question “How to deal appro-
priately with uncertainty?” should be addressed in two stages: (1) perceiving and de-
scribing uncertainty and (2) deciding and acting under uncertainty. In this paper we 
have been concerned mainly with the first stage. Our new concept enables the decision-
makers to perceive and describe uncertainty in a specific decision-making situation 
from several different perspectives within the context of an overarching, general defini-
tion of uncertainty. In doing so, the concept builds on elements of existing taxonomies 
and integrates different approaches to describing uncertainty. In future, the concept may 
be expanded by including additional perspectives on uncertainty where this is deemed 
necessary.  
The analysis of the interviews with WFD experts and of the CIS guidance docu-
ments Impress, Wateco and Proclan reveals that all aspects of uncertainty addressed by 
our concept do indeed play a role in the practice of implementing the WFD. However, 
the empirical work shows that uncertainty is not handled systematically neither in the 
guidance documents nor in the daily work of the interviewed experts. Their approach 
towards describing as well as dealing with uncertainty can be characterised as ‘mud-
dling through’: the experts act on the basis of their practical experience in dealing with 
similar situations, and so they make use of more or less ad-hoc solutions.  
In contrast to this, the standard scientific approach for dealing with uncertainty, i.e. 
probability theory, describes uncertainties in decision-making situations consistently 
and systematically. Although probability theory is reductionistic and not able to grasp 
various aspects of uncertainty on the one hand, it is fairly demanding with respect to 
data and information needs on the other. Therefore, our opinion is that probability the-
ory, in many situations, is not appropriate for describing uncertainty in environmental 
decision-making – at least without being supplemented by some other approach.  
Our framework for conceptualising uncertainty is an attempt to bridge the gap be-
tween the ‘muddling through’ of the practitioners and the demanding but narrow prob-
ability-based standard approach of the scientists. The concept emphasizes the context-
dependent nature of uncertainty, which corresponds to a more realistic description of 
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real world decision-making situations. It may encompass qualitative as well as quantita-
tive information about uncertainty and it can refer to uncertainty about scientific knowl-
edge as well as practical knowledge.  
The gap between scientific rigour and pragmatism 
The challenge to find a balance between the systematic and consistent but 
reductionistic scientific approach and the muddling through of the practi-
tioners is addressed in the following statement from one of the experts:  
“And certainly it will be worked out as scientifically as possible 
and afterwards, when it comes to concrete problems, one will defi-
nitely become more and more pragmatic”(interview statement).  
Gathering information about uncertainty is costly and takes time. Even if it is not possi-
ble to make an exact calculus of the trade-off between the costs and benefits of addi-
tional information about uncertainty, it obviously makes sense to invest more effort the 
more serious and far-reaching the decision is, the more people are affected and the more 
long-run impacts are involved. The planning decisions involved in the implementation 
of the WFD are examples of decisions that justify considerable effort.  
Other important prerequisites for dealing appropriately with uncertainty lie in the 
personal characteristics and personalities of the decision-makers, including 
(i)  their interest in making good decisions and  
(ii)  their ability to make good decisions.  
Issue (i) embraces an attitude of openness and an awareness that there might be pure ig-
norance, as well as a willingness to take responsibility, to consider public interests and 
to be transparent. Issue (ii) comprises the decision-makers’ communicative skills, their 
assertiveness as well as their respect for divergent opinions and, above all, their power 
of judgement.  
In case of important public environmental decisions (where the prerequisites listed 
are fulfilled), we recommend the following prototypic mode of proceeding when de-
scribing uncertainty:   
1.  Detect any potential sources of uncertainty and, where applicable, prioritise these 
sources. 
2.  Characterise these sources with regard to the categories fact-related and norm-
related uncertainty. 
3.  Trace the relevant causes of uncertainty. 
4.  Assess the reducibility of uncertainty. 
5.  Where appropriate, quantify some of these uncertainties using probabilities. 
This mode of proceeding enables the decision-maker to obtain a differentiated and sys-
tematic description of his uncertainty and provides an information base that simultane-
ously provides information about what is known, what is not known, and what can be 
expected or assumed. In the process, the decision-maker’s knowledge base – comprising 
both scientific knowledge and practical knowledge – will be enlarged by awareness of 
the degree of confidence he has in his knowledge.  
Our concept has been developed in relation to environmental decisions. However, 
neither the general definition of uncertainty nor the five complementary perspectives on 
uncertainty refer to exclusively environmental issues, concepts or notions. So the ques-
tion may be raised as to whether our framework for perceiving and describing uncer-
tainty may be applied to other public, or even private, decision-making processes. Our 
guess is that it would be possible to apply our framework more generally, but we leave 
the issue open because the framework has been primarily developed for and empirically 
tested in the field of environmental decision-making, and the authors have no overview 
of all the relevant specific aspects of other fields of application.  
Now, after getting a detailed picture of uncertainty in environmental decision-
making the question remains how this information about uncertainty (and pure igno-
rance) can be used fruitfully in the decision-making process (stage 2). Of course, an ex-
tensive discussion of this issue needs to be undertaken elsewhere. Nevertheless a few 
conclusions can already be drawn here.  
Formal, science-based methods that are limited to calculating probabilities in order 
to conceptualise uncertainty – such as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis 
or optimisation approaches – do not systematically take account of the uncertainty in-
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formation associated with the other perspectives on uncertainty.
12 It is left to the deci-
sion-makers to bring together the formal results and recommendations with the remain-
ing (mostly qualitative) information in order to reach a final decision – and this is not 
satisfactory. We see a great need for scientific decision support methods that are able to 
process the diversity of uncertainty information that exists, as we have shown to be pos-
sible in our framework for perceiving and describing uncertainty. 
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